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TO BECOME A MANAGER
ROGERS’S ANALYSIS
In implementing the new phone system at InstruMedia Corpora-
tion, Fred Davis thought he had done everything right. But obvi-
ously, his best laid plans did not work out as expected. Only 40% of
InstruMedia’s employees had gone to any of the training sessions,
hundreds of complaints flooded his office the week after the instal-
lation, employees had all kinds of difficulties using the system, and
11 internal units made the mutinous decision to buy themselves an-
swering machines instead of using the new equipment. Adding to
Fred’s headaches, InstruMedia’s new chief information officer, Pat
Dittmer, seemed to be siding with the strongest dissenters, and Ditt-
mer had asked one of his own people, Bob Brunson, to help Fred’s
telecommunications group weather the storm. In fact, it was begin-
ning to look as if Fred could be in jeopardy of losing his job. So
what now? How should Fred deal with the flurry of problems re-
sulting from the less-than-perfect implementation? And, if he does
survive the current crisis, how can he more successfully manage fu-
ture initiatives?
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No doubt, Fred Davis was appointed recently as InstruMedia’s
telecommunications manager because of his proven expertise. Yet,
Fred’s words and actions suggest that he does not fully understand
the nature and obligations of his new managerial role. Moreover, he
does not seem to be aware that the current crisis may stem, to a very
large degree, from his failure to manage. In fact, he has distanced
himself from the crisis by hiring a consultant, setting up a hotline,
getting his staff to log employee complaints, and sitting in his office
revising the end-user training schedule. Indeed, Fred’s focus on
task-related rather than people-related issues suggests that he has a
great deal to learn about his new job.
RELINQUISHING EXPERTISE TO BECOME AN ENABLER
Like the newly appointed managers Hill (1992) studied, Fred
seems to regard managing as doing more of what he had been doing
all along—namely, being an expert—only with more responsibil-
ity, more accountability, more power, and more control. Since be-
coming telecommunications manager, Fred has functioned primar-
ily as adoerwhose decisions have been driven almost entirely by
his expert knowledge. Indeed, to implement the phone system he
did a great deal: He “explained,” “pointed out,” made his case, and
with the assistance of his telecommunications staff, he “arranged
everything from the hardware deliveries to the setup of the training
rooms.” This focus on doing betrays Fred’s deeply held attitude
about his new job: “I’m the expert here, and I’m responsible to see
that changes get implemented properly.” In Fred’s mind, the cut-
over to the new phone system went as smoothly as could be ex-
pected. “When we installed the new system,” he might say, “it oper-
ated exactly as we planned it to. It’s just too bad our employees
failed to take the training we provided for them.” Indeed, from a
technical point of view, the new phone system may have been an ex-
cellent solution to InstruMedia’s long-term operational needs, and
yet employees at all levels regarded it as a big mistake.
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How could this be? It is pretty clear that Fred can mount argu-
ments for change; it is not at all clear whether he knows how to con-
vince those most affected by it or, heaven forbid, to enlist their feed-
back as part of his decision-making process. Responding to
InstruMedia’s influential vice president, Paul Bucter, Fred offered
a personalized training session. There is no evidence that Fred in-
quired about the particulars of Bucter’s difficulties or tried to help
him right then and there (e.g., “So, is it the playback function that
doesn’t seem to be working? Why don’t we try this function right
now? Maybe with a few calls back-and-forth between you and me
we can figure out the problem.”). Neither did Fred ask this influen-
tial vice president for his functional and political insights on the
matter.
A manager must relinquish the security of being the chief expert
and assume the far less predictable role of asking for others an-
swers. In fact, more often than not, a manager may feel helpless to
do anything but listen, a state of being from which Fred has been
quick to insulate himself. He seems blind to the multiple organiza-
tional issues inexplicably involved in managing change. He contin-
ues to regard his “daunting task” as devising and implementing
proper solutions; he seems unaware that his expertise alone does
not equip him to fulfill his managerial responsibilities. He has not
yet begun to shed hisdoerrole to become anenabler.
CREATING CONDITIONS FOR OTHERS’ SUCCESS
In the planning stages, Fred’s supervisor, Megan Varnesh, cau-
tioned him that the proposed changes would “require everyone to
learn a whole new user interface.” But Fred neither heard Megan
nor considered the implications of her concern; namely, that the
proposed changes could have a dramatic impact on users and that
impact could be costly, particularly if user needs went unaddressed.
What did Fred do? He compared vendors, he discovered that Lucid
Systems alone could offer a networking architecture capable of
handling a large-scale customer like InstruMedia, and he negoti-
ated a great price for Lucid’s services. In sum, he determined what
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should be done based on the optimal technical and financial con-
cerns, he enlisted the support of his colleagues in telecommunica-
tions, he announced the change company wide, he directed users to
take the training, and he got the new system installed—all in a per-
iod of just 12 weeks.
By contrast, Fred’s efforts to determine user needs appear to
have been minimal. He did not conduct interviews, focus groups, or
town meetings with the employees who would be using the system.
He did not run pilots to check the compatibility of the system with
user needs. He did not administer dry runs to test the impact of the
installation. (One wonders how he expected to train employees
without exploring what they needed to know.) Now, more than 700
complaints later, Fred has been forced to consider user needs and to
change the system he so carefully planned. Lucid, for instance, has
been asked to make six to eight modifications so that the system op-
erates more “like the easy-to-use VoiceMax interface” to which
many employees are accustomed. If such users’ needs had been
identified during the planning process, maybe the current mess
could have been avoided.
Unfortunately, Fred does not appear to be learning that his mana-
gerial obligation involves creating conditions to ensure the success
of others. In fact, Fred and his staff regard Bob Brunson’s com-
ments about “customer satisfaction and providing world-class ser-
vice” as an attempt to fault their vendor selection. Instead, Bob
could be trying to get them all to think about the internal customers
they serve.
GETTING THINGS DONE THROUGH OTHERS
Fred thought he had done a good job implementing the new
phone system because he got “buy-in on all the major decisions.”
But who did he ask to buy in? He asked his own telecommunica-
tions staff, and they, by all appearances, seem to have readily en-
dorsed his plans—recall how Susan Ring rose to his defense when
Megan Varnesh posed an objection? Users, on the other hand, were
not approached. Instead, Fred and his staff hammered out the de-
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tails and arranged everything from the hardware deliveries to the
setup, so when InstruMedia employees showed up for work one
Monday morning, 17,000 of them had new telephones on their
desks, and 39,000 had new voice mail boxes. Throughout the entire
process, all Fred expected of InstruMedia employees was that they
take the training. What could be easier? Why were they complain-
ing rather than thanking him? Actually, InstruMedia employees
had good reason to complain because Fred asked too little of them;
he did not get their endorsement or their insights. To Fred’s credit,
he did expect a great deal from his telecommunications staff who
rallied to help him implement the new system in no time at all. But
Fred did not expect the employees most affected by the change to
contribute to the decision-making process; rather, he made the de-
cisions for them. He did not activate these employees, but rather, he
and his staff acted on their behalf.
Of course, limiting the sphere of expectations to the telecommu-
nications staff—experts of the same kind—was probably an effi-
cient approach in the short term. Getting “outsiders” involved
would have undoubtedly complicated matters and slowed the im-
plementation process significantly. But it has been observed that
getting buy-in requires exposure to the dynamic, competing forces
at hand and that it involves managing conflicts and making trade-
offs (Hill, 1992; Quinn, 1988). Clearly, Fred does not understand
this, and unfortunately, no one seems to be teaching him either, not
even his supervisor, Megan Varnesh. She did not question his mis-
guided answer to her inquiry regarding user needs. Did she really
think he would decode the implications of her ambiguous question,
or did she simply not care enough to challenge him?
The situation at InstruMedia is a reminder that the obligations of
managing are multiple and paradoxical: One must analyze and in-
quire, direct and enable, and network with insiders and outsiders
alike to ensure that all significant sides are heard, to balance com-
peting views, to facilitate consensus, and to get buy-in. It has been
argued that becoming a manager “constitutes a profound transfor-
mation” involving thinking, feeling, and valuing in new and unfa-
miliar ways (Hill, 1992, p. 5). There is little to suggest that Fred
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Davis has begun this transition. In the midst of the crisis, Fred
seems oblivious to the fact that his management, or the lack thereof,
may be the real source of the current problems. If he does not recog-
nize this soon, Bob Brunson may be asked to replace him in the near
future.
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IN PRAISE OF MINIMALISM
TAYLOR’S ANALYSIS
According to Star and Ruhleder (1996), we ask the wrong ques-
tion when it comes to discussing infrastructure. Rather than “What
is infrastructure?” we should be framing the issue differently; we
should be asking, “When is infrastructure?” What they mean by
this question can be stated as follows: Although we tend to think of
infrastructure as an objectively definable and backgrounded nexus
of networks and facilities, this is overly simplistic. We should be
thinking relationally. One person’s backgrounded, out-of-
sight/out-of-mind infrastructure may well be a foregrounded, very
salient, to-be-dealt-with puzzle for someone else. Infrastructure
becomes infrastructure at the moment it is treated as infrastructure,
not before. And different people will make that transferral at differ-
ent times. There is no single objective definition of infrastructure.
That is why the key question is one of “when”—not “what.” You
should never take somebody else’s infrastructure for granted. It
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could very well not be the same as yours. The case study before us is
a telling instance of what can happen if you do. It illustrates a prob-
lem that frequently bedevils the implementation of new technolo-
gies, which have not yet become so much a part of the normal con-
text of work that they can be treated as “mere” infrastructure.
PROBLEM ANALYSIS
There are a number of similarities between the case we are now
considering, namely, Fred Davis with his voice/e-mail system, and
the one described by Star and Ruhleder (1996). Although they in-
vestigated a rather small and specialized community of geographi-
cally scattered biological scientists, in other respects the issue was
the same: how to furnish a centralized state-of-the-art technology
intended to serve all employees and allowing for easy intercommu-
nication. The result was the same in both cases: great system but no-
body using it much (or when they did, they were not happy with it).
In Star and Ruhleder’s example, even the people who claimed to
like their new system turned out, on closer inspection, not to be us-
ing it. When this fact was pointed out to them, these biologists re-
sponded that they had been “just going to boot up.” Well, at least
they did not complain, and unlike unhappy Fred at InstruMedia,
there was no threatening figure of a Pat Dittmer looming in the
background.
There are some general principles involved here. One is that
what is easy for someone who is used to working with a system is
hard for someone else who is not. This difference becomes particu-
larly worrisome when one of those involved is the designer or a
techie, for whom all the jargon is transparent, and the other is a na-
ive user for whom itis jargon. Telecommunications managers
should be particularly wary of this factor because they usually are
persuaded that a system is easy to use, as Fred was, by someone for
whom it actually is—namely, the vendor, Lucid Systems.
A second principle is that learning to use a new system almost al-
ways takes more time than the vendors allow for, and the learning
comes at a cost: It is time not spent doing your main job and, for
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busy people, this can be a serious inconvenience. The usefulness of
“training sessions” is greatly overestimated because almost no one
learns that way. Effective learning occurs through trial and error,
frequent use, and getting helpful advice when you need it—not ac-
cording to some trainer’s schedule. So people, being sensible, avoid
training sessions, as Fred found out.
Both these problems are exacerbated when it is somebody else
who is deciding on the choice of system for you—imposing it on
you, from your point of view. Every large organization, at least in
Weick’s (1985) opinion, is a mixture of tight (at the local level) and
loose (at the global level) coupling. Because of the loose coupling
side of organizational communication, there is a good deal of de
facto local autonomy and of development of group cultures around
different activities. This local autonomy and activity-based group
culture is a plus—not a minus—for an organization because it
makes the organization more adaptive to its environment. But it
also creates a certain “touchiness” when it comes to centralized
planning—especially in the wake of a merger, which is universally
recognized to be an extremely tense experience!
Finally, there seems to be a growing phenomenon oftechnology
battle fatigue. Hype ends up breeding skepticism. We have had a
succession of “miracle” technologies over the past generation, but
somehow, the miracle remains just around the next corner. This
problem has been attracting growing attention in the sociological
literature that addresses new technology implementation. The gap
between expectation and actual performance is ascribed by Sachs
(1995), for example, to the conceptual gulf between “organiza-
tional, explicit” views of work and those that are more “activity-
oriented, tacit.” Systems designers and managerial planners, such
as Fred, tend to think organizational, explicit. What Sachs and oth-
ers in the same research tradition are highlighting is the extent to
which work depends on accumulated routine and on informal cul-
tural practices that become encrusted on the work situation. When-
ever technology interferes with this largely invisible (because tacit)
aggregation of tiny adaptations to circumstance, it becomes no
longer a help but a hindrance. It is this that I would understand as
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the motivation for the 700 complaints with which Fred had to cope
in the first week after the new system was installed (and in the midst
of the holiday season, at that!).
RECOMMENDATIONS AND MUSINGS
So what is a good strategy in technology choice and implemen-
tation? What I would suggest is to take a leaf out of the system de-
signer’s workbook. In the earlier days of system design, the con-
struction of a computer program of the kind used to model and
control organizational process followed a principle of block design.
Block design was a top-down logic that meant taking a comprehen-
sive view of the system and building an analog of it constructed out
of formal computer code to represent organizational activities. This
kind of thinking—treating the organization as if it were a logically
structured and fully coordinated embedding of routines and sub-
routines, although it began as an exigency imposed by computer
logic—began to migrate over into the literature on management.
The classic reference is March and Simon’s (1958)Organizations,
which, for the first time, laid out a fully elaborated blueprint of the or-
ganization as an information-processing system, on the model of the
computer. The influence of this pioneering book (and it hasbeen very
influential) was hardly accidental: One of the authors, Simon, al-
ready a recognized authority on administration and organization-
al economics (for which he won a Nobel prize) was also a star of
the new field of artificial intelligence. It was March and Simon’s
book that legitimated the kind of top-down rationalizing approach
to management that we have seen illustrated in the present
case.
But current system analytic practices in computer design have
moved away from these earlier monolithic symbolic representa-
tions to a reliance on much more flexible methodologies such as
object-oriented programming and hypermedia.1 The advantage of
these newer approaches is in the economies they open up. If you can
treat the objects in your program as encapsulated routines, then you
can ignore their internal complexities. You can, instead, concen-
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trate on designing better ways to link them up. Let us call this the
minimalistapproach to design whether we are discussing design in
software or administration. A minimalist approach assumes that,
instead of standardizing across the board, good telecommunica-
tions planning aims to disturb as little as possible the islands of lo-
cal adaptation. Good telecommunications planning concentrates
on transparency and flexibility at the interstices.
It is true that standardization has been the rallying cry of the tele-
communications industry for many decades (with permanent inter-
national committees for whom it is their principal concern). But the
idea of a common standard for all, independent of local reality, is, in
fact, a concept with much deeper roots that go back to the very idea
of modernity (Bowker & Star, in press).2 A degree of standardiza-
tion is obviously necessary for there to be a system at all, but the re-
lationship between standardization and productivity is curvilinear.
Performance is initially enhanced by standardization, but beyond a
certain point, the relationship turns negative: Too great standardi-
zation depresses performance whenever it inhibits local adaptation.
The postmodern challenge is to admit the continued existence of lo-
cal variety by limiting standardization to that which is minimally
necessary.
This challenge even makes good organizational sense. One of
the great classics of the artificial intelligence literature is Ross Ash-
by’s (1960)Design for a Brain. It is a book that could as easily have
had the title “Design for an Organization” because the principles he
outlines are equally valid for social, as well as for cognitive, organi-
zation. His main point is that any system capable of adapting suc-
cessfully to an even minimally complex environment cannot be one
with complete communication between every element in it. There
has to be a degree of local autonomy for the indispensable accumu-
lation of adaptations that makes an organization responsive to its
environment. Ashby’s other point is that levels of communication
must be able to vary over time; the thresholds of communication
must be variable, depending on circumstance.3
So now let us consider the questions we have been asked. I will
take the second one first: How can Fred convince his organization
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to stay with voice mail and e-mail, for the good of the company?
My answer would be that he should not even try, if what is meant by
“staying with” is the centralized system Fred initially had in mind.
When a battle is lost, it is lost.
Instead, to answer the question of how to proceed in implement-
ing the new e-mail system, he should concentrate on developing the
best system he can and making it available for cross-group and
intraorganizational communication. There is no danger of the com-
pany abandoning voice mail and e-mail in today’s world; these are
rapidly becoming universal facilities. All he has to do is to ride the
wave.
This raises a supplementary consideration. One of the things that
got Fred into trouble was that abrupt August 1 switchover. Such
all-at-once strategies are tempting for managers because they con-
note decisiveness and, in the words of reengineering, a “revolution”
in management. But they are an invitation to the kind of disaster
with which Fred found himself confronted. A better, if less spec-
tacular, strategy is incrementalism: Start modestly and take the
time to make sure that at least some people are comfortable with the
new system.
One dangerous illusion that surrounds the technology wave is
that technology design ends at the door of the developer. In fact,
technology design is a continuous phenomenon; technology design
continues after the machinery has been installed in the user com-
munity location (Barley, 1986; Heaton, 1997; Orlikowsky, 1991;
Orr, 1996; Suchman, 1987; Taylor, Groleau, Heaton, & Van Every,
in press). By proceeding incrementally, the telecommunications
manager gets the benefit of learning about the design process that
is going on in his or her own firm. Do not just consult “a handful of
well-placed executives” in developing policy—go talk to actual
users.
And this brings us to the first question: how to stem the flow of
complaints about the new phone and voice mail system. The an-
swer is: wait, do not panic, keep working with people. The root of
the problem is trying to accomplish too much too fast—however
tempting it is to do so in an era of what Cushman and King (1997)
call “high-speed management.”
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I would like to make a couple of final remarks. I am not sure
Fred’s neck is safe; that big, bad chief information officer, Mr. Ditt-
mer, looks like he could be a real meanie. But, hopefully, Fred will
survive to take up a position of responsibility somewhere. After all,
he sounds like a good guy. If he does take another position, he might
want to bear in mind one or two precepts. The first is that we always
take the vendor’s assurance that the system is up to every challenge
with a grain of salt. We need not attribute anything but the most
honorable of motives to the developer to nevertheless suspect that
there are going to be problems in implementation. In my experi-
ence, there are always problems. It is not necessarily a fault of the
system (although sometimes it is); the issue is much more funda-
mental (and this is the issue I raised at the beginning of my case
analysis). Any large organization is a congeries of quite diverse cul-
tures—each of these diverse cultures is at a different level of “infra-
structurization” (to coin a term) of its technological mix. So the
successful implementation of any new technology is going to be
variable across the spectrum, and intelligent planning needs to take
account of this variability.
My second point is that the design-of-technology process does
not stop when the product is advertised as a “new technology” and
sold. Technology remains a surface of emergence (Heaton, 1997;
Orlikowsky, 1991; Taylor et al., in press) for the display of human
intentionality, even after it has been implemented. It is for this rea-
son that a degree of incrementalism is indispensable in the intro-
duction of new systems.
And, finally, I would recommend that Fred (and the rest of us) be
careful about raising the expectations of superiors too high. If they
are disappointed, they will not see the contingencies with which
you, as a manager, had to cope, but just the result. You get to carry
the can. Your headaches will be invisible to them, but theirs won’t!
NOTES
1. Object-oriented programming has as its objective to encapsulate frequently performed
functions, in much the way we have become accustomed to do on our computer screens
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where, by simply activating an icon on the screen, we obtain a desired response (“Print,”
for example). Once designed and encapsulated, such functions can be used in constructing
other programs, with a resulting economy of time and effort. Hypermedia allow for asso-
ciational, or horizontal, links between terms and concepts and thus provide great flexibil-
ity, compared to the earlier tree structures with their rigid hierarchical search procedures.
The Internet employs hypermedia extensively, and in many respects, this feature explains
its popularity.
2. If there is any meaning to the termpostmodern, it seems to me that it is this: If, beyond a
certain point, standardization has negative payoffs, then the postmodern challenge is to bal-
ance the need for local variety with systemic requirements of standardization. Such a balanc-
ing act is a direct consequence of globalization and is, thus, an unforeseen consequence, or
“perverse effect,” of modernity.
3. Interestingly enough, the field of artificial intelligence is now coming back to Ashby’s
(1960) way of thinking. For a discussion of current thinking about Ashby’s work, see Taylor
& Van Every (in press).
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COMMUNICATION IS THE KEY
TO RECOVERING USER TRUST
FINN’S RESPONSE
The telecommunications team at InstruMedia Corporation faces
a number of thorny problems. Many of these are of their own mak-
ing, and those that are not are traceable to the InstruMedia execu-
tive team, which missed an opportunity to work together to manage
a common problem. This analysis is organized around major issues
in technology implementation. In addition, it presents a chrono-
logical treatment of the problems, and so we start with the charge-
back system.
CENTRALIZATION/DECENTRALIZATION DECISIONS
The degree of centralization is sometimes presented as a techno-
logical decision and sometimes as a management decision. Almost
without exception, however, a decision in one arena affects the
other. Typically, a charge-back system is designed to ensure that
every unit within an organization pays for the resources it actually
uses. The cost-control principle behind charge-back is decentrali-
zation of decision making. But charge-back systems work only if
the units incurring the charges have a choice. For example, a com-
pany can reduce the overall cost of centralized computing re-
sources by distributing control for those costs across units. This is
because some units will avoid paying those costs by reducing
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use or by finding other ways to get the work done (e.g., desktop
computing).
Consequently, management cannot simply decentralize costs
without decentralizing the decision to incur those costs. Imagine a
charge-back system for e-mail expenses. If the e-mail system is in-
tegral to the work of every unit, every unit will pay the charges be-
cause unit members decide that the cost of not paying them is too
high. In a company without a history of e-mail use, however, a
charge-back system runs the risk of having some units opting out of
e-mail because they do not see the benefits.
Yet e-mail, voice mail, and virtually all communication systems
are critical mass technologies. Among other things, this means that
the greater the number of people using the system, the more useful
the system is to everyone. Voice mail presents a peculiar problem as a
charge-back technology because the two primary applications for
voice mail technology are very different. The first is call answering,
which is analogous to using the system as an answering machine.
Call answering is primarily an individual application, although
forwarding call answering messages to others is a major advantage
that voice mail has over answering machines. The second applica-
tion for voice mail is internal messaging, which is analogous to us-
ing the system like a voice version of e-mail. While call answering
can provide hard-dollar savings, internal messaging can provide
large soft-dollar savings through increased productivity. With the
proper training, short voice mail messages can replace longer and
hard-to-complete telephone calls for a variety of tasks.
Unfortunately, a surprisingly small number of organizations
have implemented voice mail in such a way that the users under-
stand the value of internal messaging. InstruMedia has clearly
worked toward having a large community of users for internal voice
mail, but it is not surprising that a number of units would see an-
swering machines as a cost-effective choice when the decision
making is decentralized. However, such a decision works against
the organizational goal of using voice mail as a company-wide
communication system. Because InstruMedia saw voice mail as a
company-wide communication resource, decisions about voice
mail should have been kept centralized.
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The silver lining in the InstruMedia charge-back problems is the
useful information that it brings to the telecommunications man-
agement team. Currently, many units do not see voice mail as better
than answering machines. Users who have not experienced the
“telephone time management” and improved productivity value of
using voice mail for internal messaging are frequently unpersuaded
by statistics and charts. The telecommunications management
team could arrange conversations with respected managers who are
experiencing benefits to which the mavericks can relate. If the team
treats this situation as an opportunity for educating users, then they
may yet return these users to the voice mail fold. Interestingly, cen-
tralized decision making was also partly to blame for the problems
with the implementation of the new telephone switches and voice
mail systems. Although the decision to implement was the respon-
sibility of the telecommunications management team, they would
have benefited greatly from increased communication with the
population of users in the company.
USER INVOLVEMENT AND COMMUNICATION
One of the cardinal rules of technology implementation is to
involve users in the process. This is particularly important for
the former Imminence employees who probably experience
more uncertainty about the recent merger than other employees.
By communicating with the user population early in the cycle,
system designers can incorporate options that suit the intended
audience.
In the case of standard, off-the-shelf systems such as voice mail,
user input plays a slightly different role. Users can still be polled
about a variety of available features and system options. I suspect
the InstruMedia and Lucid Systems staffs conducted standard sta-
tion reviews used to specify individual telephone and voice mail
requirements. But the simple task of communicating with the
user population about any upcoming changes should not be
underestimated.
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Yet, there is no sign that the telecommunications management
team ever presented their fellow InstruMedia employees with (a) an
explanation of the problems the company faced, (b) a request for
their support during the transition, or (c) a warning about the learn-
ing curve they would need to endure to enjoy the benefits of the new
Lucidity system. The switch made obvious sense to the telecom-
munications management team, but they needed to educate their
user base.
Even if users are not involved in the design of the system, they
mustbe allies in any successful system implementation. Presented
with a problem, most people choose to be good corporate citizens.
Shown a solution, most will do their part to help the organization
succeed. I return to specific recommendations for communication
with the users after presenting a (faulty) problem analysis.
(FAULTY) PROBLEM ANALYSIS
The 700 complaints received after the cutover needed to be taken
seriously but also should be kept in perspective. They represent
fewer than 2% of the 39,000 employees with new voice mail boxes.
With such a disruptive change in the daily routine of the user popu-
lation, the telecommunications management team should have
anticipated some level of complaints. If they had, their analysis
would have been based on whether the complaints exceeded expec-
tations and why. The actual volume of complaints appears to be
normal for this type of implementation and, therefore, should have
been anticipated.
When a crisis is looming, any organization looks to its senior
management team to provide stability. Pat Dittmer, the new In-
struMedia chief information officer (CIO), failed his staff and the
organization by not standing behind the decision made by his peo-
ple. First, he should have seen there was no reason to panic. Second,
he missed an opportunity to establish a relationship based on trust
and respect with the telecommunications management staff. Third,
he could have personally handled the complaints from his executive
peers. Fourth, he should have seen that this was a short-term prob-
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lem, so the solution lay within the InstruMedia organization—not
by having the vendor alter the product.
OPPORTUNITIES IN RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEM
If I was the consultant hired to recommend a solution to the cur-
rent set of implementation problems, I would recommend the fol-
lowing actions:
Communicate with the users. The telecommunications team
should immediately send a letter to all employees. This letter would
be designed to accomplish several strategic goals. First, it would
acknowledge the churn caused by the new systems and apologize
for not communicating earlier with the employees. Second, it
would explain the basic reasons why the change was necessary as
well as the advantages to individual users and the organization as a
whole. Third, it would request employees’support during this tran-
sition to the new systems. Fourth, it would attempt to (belatedly) set
user expectations by estimating the amount of time required to be-
come familiar with the new telephone and voice mail user inter-
faces (typically, 3 to 6 months).
Distribute new documentation. It is not clear what documenta-
tion was distributed to users at the time of the cutover. But it is im-
portant to realize that most users know what features they really
need. What they need most is information about those features in
the new system. A transition from one user interface to another is
facilitated by providing a cross-reference chart that lists the feature
name and compares the button presses used in the old system with
those needed in the new system. This could answer many of the
most pressing user questions about both the telephone and voice
mail features.
Reimplement training. Hopefully, the telecommunications team
used two types of voice mail training: one for new users and another
for users switching from one voice mail system to another. Regard-
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less, by the time any additional training could be implemented most
users will have struggled through the basics, so another approach
might be more successful at this point. In this new approach, I
would recommend the continued use of a hotline—not so much to
take complaints but to provide instruction about particular features.
When people change user interfaces, they know what features they
value. What they need to know is how to access those features on
the new system. Hotline personnel can also let callers know where
to look for new documentation in their mail.
Involve senior management. A classic principle of organiza-
tional change in general, and technology implementation in par-
ticular, is the need for senior management buy-in and involvement.
Some executives apparently see themselves as victims of this im-
plementation. This is an opportunity for the CIO to enlist their sup-
port in pulling the organization out of this problem.
The executives can support the decision to switch to the new sys-
tems, and they can communicate this support to their people. In ad-
dition, the CIO can salvage the charge-back system by preserving
the critical mass of users needed to make a communication system
successful. One approach would be to enlist the support of the CEO
and all the executives in using the voice mail system for occasion-
ally distributing messages to their staffs. Because those with an-
swering machines cannot receive such information, the value of
voice mail vis-à-vis answering machines now becomes obvious.
Implementing a new e-mail system. On the question of how to
proceed in implementing a new e-mail system, I advise that the
team proceed carefully. The lessons of this case point out the neces-
sity of engaging the user population early in the process. The e-mail
system being considered will change not only the user interface but
also how and where messages are stored. As with user interface is-
sues, the telecommunications management team must anticipate a
learning curve and guide users through these changes. But if there
are clear business reasons for changing systems, the failure to do it
right once should not stop the team from attempting to do it right the
next time!
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